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1Summary
Predatory pricing poses a dilemma which perplexed and intrigued the competition
community for many years. It is one of the most discussed topics in the area of
antitrust economics, as the critical issue is to meld economic insights with sound
legal rules. Despite the energy devoted to the subject by many distinguished
observers from the economic and legal professions and their attempts to find
proper rules that can be applied by competition policy authorities, little agreement
has emerged.
Predatory business behaviour has various forms, p.ex. non-price predation. This
paper, however, deals with the particular significant category of predatory
conduct, which could be called the “traditional” model of predatory pricing. The
discussion will further be based on the consensus in modern economics that
predatory pricing can be a successful and therefore rational business strategy.
The basic concept of predatory pricing can roughly be described as follows.
When a company is accused of predatory pricing, its being accused of pricing at
levels that are unreasonably low, whether because there are below some measure
of cost or because they otherwise generate an inadequate return. So far, there
seems nothing wrong with the low pricing, since low prices are apparently
beneficient for the customer and in fact usually the result and aim of a free market
and healthy competition, low prices being the hallmark of competition.
On the other hand, history and economic theory teach that predatory pricing can
be an instrument of abuse. The predator offers its goods or services at
unrealistically low prices in order to achieve a longer-term objective. The
predatory company may be attempting to deter a rivals entry on the market or to
drive him out of the market, so that the former attains a monopoly position, then
being able to recoup its losses from the below-cost selling period along with
making even more profits by holding the prices on high level. This subsequently
turns the apparent benefit of the former lower price around into the opposite,
hurting the costumer and the rival and thus competition as such by the unfair
practice.
However, even tough this basic theory seems straight forward, the crux of
determining predatory pricing lies in detail. The difficulty of assessing predatory
pricing is rooted within the arrangement of the economic elements and the legal
aspects, hence to merge economic insights with practically workable rules. The
critical issue for antitrust analysis is to distinguish in a practical manner predatory
conduct from merely healthy competition.
Tests on how to determine the thin line between unlawful conduct and healthy
competition are disputed in the academic debate in mind-numbing detail. The only
basic agreement in the wide ranging approach suggestions appears to be that
scrutinizing a company`s conduct requires careful examination and factual inquiry
which has to be guided by a sound legal rule and a thorough economic analysis.
2However, disagreement is vast concerning the recognition of a proper and
workable rule. It ranges from the acknowledgment that predatory pricing occurs
rather seldom and any attempt to restrict competition harms more that it helps, to
detailed economic analysis tests which seem to overload the courts ability to work
efficiently.
The concept of predatory pricing has thus been a familiar one for many years. It
was not until the last two decades however, that a new literature in economics
and law has emerged which re-examines the logic of predatory pricing strategy
more general, involving strategic, game-theoretic analyses of imperfectly
competitive behaviour in contrast to the more standard economic logic embodied
in the Chicago school of though, along with a deeper understanding of imperfect
information between competitors.
In the United States, predatory pricing has been of concern at least since the
perceived activities of J. D. Rockefeller`s Standard Oil Company helped to give
birth to the Clayton Act in 1914. In the EC however, it was not until the late
1980s that the ECJ and the Commission had the chance to deal with predatory
pricing cases, most prominently the renowned AKZO case. Therefore one may
perceive that EC competition law can draw from the US experience. This is not
lastly illustrated by the fact that for the most part theories on predatory pricing
have been developed by legal and economic scholars in the US.
Courts and competition authorities subsequently had the chance to investigate
predatory pricing claims and develop their own tests, incorporation the theories
which emerged in the academic debate over the last 20 years.
In the EC, the Commission and the ECJ in recent times decided on predatory
pricing cases involving market dominating companies such as AKZO, Tetra Pak
and Irish sugar. The US Supreme Court on the other hand set new standards on
identifying the issue in its landmark Brooke Group decision. These decisions were
both criticized and welcomed by the competition community, clarifying the
approaches on predatory pricing, but at the same time leaving several problems
unsolved.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the problem of predatory pricing with a view
to both sides of the Atlantic and to analyse the different approaches put forward
by the scholary legal and economic debate and their utilization by the competition
authorities.
To achieve this, the phenomenon of predatory pricing will be described in a
general manner followed by a look at the economic situation behind a predatory
business strategy. Then the main theories on how to assess predatory pricing will
be scrutinised. These theories cover a wide array of approaches, recognising that
on the one hand predatory pricing can be an abuse and on the other hand that
price reductions are the hallmark of competition. After that, the legal provisions in
the EU and US under which predatory pricing is dealt with will be explained.
Subsequently, the leading decisions on the topic by the ECJ, the Commission and
the US Supreme Court are examined and the different approaches of the
3competition authorities are compared, illustrating the difficulties they face when
dealing with predatory pricing. Concluding the discussion, the paper will identify
the main elements of a workable theory by scrutinising the way the competition
authorities have incorporated the academic debate in their decisions and how they
were able to work with these approaches.
4Abbreviations
Art. Article
ATC Average Total Costs
AVC Average Variable Costs
CFI Court of first Instance
DOT Department of Transportation (of the
United States
DP Deutsche Post AG
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECLR European Competition Law Review
ECR European Court Reports
et seq. et sequentes
fn. footnote
FTC Federal Trade Commission (of the
United States)
i.e. id est
ibid. ibidem
L.J. Law Journal
L.Rev. Law Review
O.J. Official Journal (of the European
Communities)
OECD Organisation for Economic and Cultural
Development
p.ex. per exemplum
5RIW Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft
TRR Trade Regulation Reports
U.S. United States Supreme Court Reports
U.S.C.A. United States Code Annotated
v versus
61 Introduction
“Price competition is the essence of free and open competition. It favours
more efficient firms and it is for the benefit of consumers both in the short
and the long run. Dominant firms not only have the right but should be
encouraged to compete on price”
 as Advocate General Fennelley stressed the importance of price competition in
his opinion in the Compagnie Maritime Belge case1.
Low prices are apparently the hallmark of competition. They are beneficient for
the consumer and in fact usually the result of a free market and healthy
competition, yet they could harm competition and ultimately the consumer when a
firm uses unrealistically low prices to achieve a longer-term objective by engaging
in unfair practises.
In most general terms, predatory pricing can be described as a price reduction
that is profitbale only because of the added market power the predator gains from
eliminating, disciplining or otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or
potential rival2. Thus, the phenomenon of predatory pricing poses a dilemma
which perplexed and intrigued the competition community for many years. It is
one of the most discussed topics in the area of antitrust economics, as the critical
issue is to meld economic insights with sound legal rules. Despite the energy
devoted to the subject by many distinguished observers from the economic and
legal professions and their attempts to find proper rules that can be applied by
competition policy authorities, little agreement has emerged.
Tests on how to determine the thin line between unlawful conduct and healthy
competition are disputed in mind-numbing detail. The only basic agreement in the
various approach suggestions appears to be that scrutinizing a firms`s conduct
requires careful examination and factual inquiry which has to be guided by a
sound legal rule and a thorough economic analysis. However, disagreement is vast
concerning the recognition of a proper and workable rule. It ranges from the
acknowledgment that predatory pricing occurs rather seldom and that any attempt
to restrict competition harms more that it helps, to detailed economic analysis
tests which seem to overload the courts ability to work efficiently3.
                                                
1 Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Belge Transports and others v
Commission, Opinion of Mr Fennelly ECR. 2000 I-1411.
2 Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 3 with further references. There are other forms of predatory
business behaviour which can involve such strategies as predatory investment, excessive
product differentiation, predatory advertising or predatory product innovation, see p.ex.
Hovenkamp (2001) at 281 et seq and below fn. 33.
3 See below under 3.
7Although predatory pricing had legal recognition for about a century4, it was not
until McGee`s work5 in 1958 that is was subjected to economic analysis. Since
then there has been academic debate to assess the problem carried out by a vast
flow of literature and court cases. However in the last two decades new literature
in economics and law has emerged which re-examines the logic of predatory
pricing strategy more general, involving strategic, game-theoretic analyses of
competitive behaviour6, along with a deeper understanding of imperfect
information between competitors.
In the United States, predatory pricing has been of concern at least since the
activities of J. D. Rockefeller`s Standard Oil Company helped to give birth to the
Clayton Act in 1914. In the EC however, it was not until the late 1980s that the
ECJ and the Commission had the chance to deal with predatory pricing cases,
most prominently the renowned AKZO case. Therefore one may percieve that
EC competition law can draw from the US experience7. The decisions by the
courts and competition authorities were both, criticized and welcomed by the
competition community, clarifying the respective approaches to predatory pricing
but regrettably at the same time leaving several problems unsolved.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the problem of predatory pricing with a view
to both sides of the Atlantic and to analyse the different approaches put forward
by the scholary legal and economic debate and their utilization by the competition
authorities.
To achieve this, the phenomenon of predatory pricing will be described in a
general manner, followed by a look at the economic situation behind a predatory
business strategy. Then the main theories on how to assess predatory pricing will
be scrutinised. These theories cover a wide array of approaches, recognising that
on the one hand predatory pricing can be an abuse and on the other hand that
price reductions are the hallmark of competition. After that the legal provisions in
the EU and US under which predatory pricing is dealt with will be explained.
Subsequently, the leading decisions on the topic by the ECJ, the Commission and
the US Supreme Court are examined and the different approaches of the
competition authorities are compared, illustrating the difficulties they face when
dealing with predatory pricing. Concluding the discussion, the paper will identify
the main elements of a workable theory by scrutinising the way the competition
authorities have incorporated the academic debate in their decisions and how they
were able to work with these approaches.
                                                
4 O`Hagan at 1.
5 McGee (1958) at 137 et seq.
6 Which stands in contrast to the more standard economic logic embodied in the Chicago
school of though, followed largely by US courts. For a more detailed appraisal see p.ex.
Hovenkamp (2001) at 257.
7 This is not lastly illustrated by the fact that the majority of the theories on how to assess
predatory pricing have been developed by legal and economic scholars in the US.
82 The Concept and Ecomonic
Background of Predatory
Pricing
The possibility of damage to competition arises when one firm takes action which
will harm the interests of a competitor. Such occasions are, however, ubiquitous
in industrial life. Competition causes harm. The task is to identify the special
category of actions which go too far, which hurt competition rather than just
competitors. In order to do so, the understanding of business conduct, involving
the wide array of economic rationales is essential.
2.1 Concept of predatory pricing
The basic concept of predatory pricing can roughly be described as follows.
When a company is accused of predatory pricing, it is being accused of pricing at
levels that are unreasonably low, be it because there are below some measure of
cost or because they otherwise generate an inadequate return. So far, there seems
nothing wrong with the low pricing, since low prices are apparently beneficient for
the customer and in fact usually the result and aim of a free market and healthy
competition.
On the other hand, history and economic theory teach that predatory pricing can
be an instrument of abuse. The predator offers its goods or services at
unrealistically low prices in order to achieve a longer-term objective8. The
predatory company may be attempting to deter a rivals entry on the market or to
drive him out of the market, so that the former attains a monopoly position, then
being able to recoup its losses from the below-cost selling period along with
making even more profits by holding the prices on high level. This subsequently
turns the apparent benefit of the former lower price around into the opposite,
hurting the costumer and the rival and thus competition as such by the unfair
practice.
2.2 Economic background of predatory pricing
Taking a close look at the economic situation on the market where the alleged
predatory pricing behaviour is to be taken place is crucial for assessing the
problem at hand. Subsequently the conduct of the alleged predator is to be
                                                
8 This price cuting strategy most often involves price discrimination in the ”target” area of
the predator and may constitute an infringement of competition provisions as such,
whithout involving below-cost price cutting, see p.ex. Martinez at 125.
9examined before this background. It is therefore necessary to examine the
measures and prerequisites on the market involved. Even though there is a lively
discussion on what the prerequisites for successful predatory pricing strategy are,
there is nevertheless consensus on the main aspects on which market conditions
are necessary.
However, any person entering into the field of predatory pricing should be aware
of the most striking danger, the relationship between the law and economic
reasoning on the subjects9. This becomes painfully clear when competition
authorities and courts have to decide on complex economic theories. It is not
only, that if a court is confronted with a complex and research intensive theory, it
will not be able to work efficient. The problem runs deeper than that. There are
differences within the economic and legal work with that respect, that the former
will do academic work which will produce data that is minimally consistent with
theory but can not rule out alternative explanations. Even worse, the fact-finding
power of economists is considerably greater compared to that of the court when
examining an individual case10. In the US this problem is enhanced due to the
procedural differences to the EC, regarding the fact that in antitrust cases the
multifaceted evidence is presented to a lay-jury, which has been identified as one
of the main factors in judicial inability to confront strategic complexity in predatory
pricing cases11.
2.2.1 Cost measures involed in predatory pricing
Central to the debate on assessing predatory pricing is the role and meaning of
costs. It is therefore necessary to determine briefly the basic costs involved in the
economic analysis of predatory pricing behaviour12.
Generally speaking, fixed costs are those that continue even if the firm produced
more output, p.ex. interest on debt, taxes, depreciation and irreducible overhead
and which do not vary with the output. Variable costs are those that vary with
changes in output, p.ex. raw materials, energy and labour. Out of these two costs
emerge the total fixed costs, which are the fixed costs plus variable costs.
Average variable costs (AVC) are the variable costs involved in the production of
one unit, i.e. the total variable costs divided by units of output. Average total costs
(ATC) are the total costs involved in the production of one unit, to be calculated
by the total fixed and variable costs divided by units of output.
Marginal costs are the change in total costs brought about by increasing or
decreasing the output by one unit. Fixed costs do not enter into the computation
of the marginal costs, because they are the same at all levels of output.
                                                
9 See Smith at 209.
10 Hovenkamp (2001) at 268.
11 Ibid.
12 For a more detailed appraisal on the cost issue see p.ex. Posner/Easterbrook at 684 et seq,
including further references.
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Costs that are attributable to a product when a product is attributed to a
company`s existing product line are referred to as incremental costs.
2.2.2 Market conditions
Predatory pricing may prove to be a successful business strategy only if the
market conditions allow it. Such a market structure exists when a dominant firm
or a small group of jointly acting firms has high market share and when there are
both, entry and re-entry barriers13. Only when these conditions exist may
predation be a feasible strategy for the firm and may thus harm competition. This
is consistent with the two-tier approach first taken by Joskow and Klevorick14,
according to who the market structure determines whether a predatory pricing
scheme may potentially impair competition15.
The starting point of the rationally underlying such a market conditions analysis is
based on the notion of “error costs” .Such costs could be of two kinds. Firstly the
error that involves labelling a truly competitive price cut as predatory, the false
positive error, and the error that involves the failure to identify a truly predatory
price cut, the false negative error. Both types of errors pose a serious threat to
competition policy. To minimise these errors, a thorough analysis of the market
conditions is consequently inevitable.
2.2.2.1 Dominance
In theory, any undertaking could engage in predatory pricing conduct. In practice
on the other hand, only a dominant company would do so for various reasons.
Firstly, there is the need of large capital reserves in order to sustain the losses
during the below-cost selling period, which are most likely only present within
large dominant firms16. Secondly, it would make little sense for a company to
sustain these losses and invest its capital when the market would remain relatively
competitive as it would have no expectance of recoupment. This is virtually only
the case when an already dominant firm can strengthen its position on the market
and eventually have monopoly power in order to dictate the prices.
When analysing the dominance of a company, the market has to be scrutinized
with regards to the relevant product and geographic market by examining the
potential demand and substitutability of the products or services17. Predatory
pricing may however not only take place in the market where the predator holds a
dominant position but in an adjacent market with the aim of deterring entry or
expansion of rivals to other markets where the predator operates18. Even if the
                                                
13This is now widely accepted by the scholary debate and the courts. See p.ex.
Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 31 with further references.
14 Joskow/Klevorick at 234 et seq.
15 See below under 3.5.
16 Furse at 234.
17 see p.ex. the Commission Notice on definition of the relevant market in OJ C 372 (1997).
18 For a critical appraisal of the Commissions decision on Tetra Pak II see Levy at 104 et seq.
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prey has a significant market power in which predatory pricing is taking place, the
economic strength of the predator may derive from its positions on other
markets19.
2.2.2.2 Barriers to entry and re-entry
Successful predatory pricing necessitates a certain level of entry barriers to the
market. Otherwise a victim of predation or other potential rivals would
immediately (re-) enter the market once the predator raises its prices and by
adding their output to that of the predator drive prices back to competition level.
Consequently the predator could not use its monopoly power to maintain price at
a supra-competitive level in order to recoup its losses.
Entry barriers exist when a new market entrant faces costs that the incumbent
predatory need not bear or no longer faces20, most frequently sunk costs, i.e. a
fixed costs investment p.ex. the building of infrastructure such as railroad tracks in
order to provide the services. The entrant on the other hand must incur such costs
and hence faces the risk of underpricing by an incumbent with sunk costs, the
latter acting as a barrier to entry, giving the incumbent the power to raise prices
above the competition level21.
Re-entry barriers on the other hand exist when a firm that has left a market bears
significant costs in seeking to reopen its business, p.ex. for a firm to rebuild its
through the exit of the market damaged reputation with costly marketing
campaigns. In the absence of re-entry barriers the firm which has been forced to
exit the market because it was unable to sustain the artificially low prices dictated
by the predator could enter the market again once prices are raised to monopoly
level, thus being able to undermine the predators pricing policy22.
2.2.2.3 Deep pocket requirement
Only firms possessing sufficient financial reserves may be successful in engaging in
a predatory pricing strategy. Financial reserves may in turn be possessed by firms
with large market shares with relative efficiencies and competitive costs or other
advantages over their rivals or with operations in independent relative markets. A
firm with multi market operations p.ex. might have easier access to funds derived
from profits of other markets in which it successfully operates23.
Since in the first phase of a predatory scheme, i.e. when selling at artificially low
prices, the predator will incur losses over a substantial period of time, it becomes
clear that the predator`s financial resources must be greater than the ones of his
rival and the latter will may not be as able as the predator to withstand losses.
                                                
19 Newton at 131.
20 Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 31.
21 Ibid at 32.
22 Past predation itself can also operate as such a barrier where reputation effects are
present. See ibid. at 32, Newton at 128 and below 2.3.3.
23 Mastromanolis at 216.
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However, this traditional “war chest” has to be seen in the light of the economics
in functioning capital markets, which would enable the prey to raise funds,
enabling it to sustain the price war for a longer time and even eventually survive
it24.
2.3 Rationality and strategies of predatory
pricing
Despite the widespread believe in the existence of predatory pricing, the logic of
the practice was not subjected to adequately reasoned economic analysis until
McGee`s 1958 re-examination of the Standard Oil case25. He argued that
predatory pricing was not a rational strategy because it was very unlikely to yield
a positive return and therefore rarely adopted.
However, economic development over the last 20 years of rigorous analysis now
enables economists to explain when predation can be rational. These works
involve a broader strategic game-theoretic analysis of imperfectly competitive
behaviour and reputation effects26, recognising the possibility of recouping the
losses of the below-cost selling period and thus the rationality of a predatory
pricing strategy.
2.3.1 Recoupment
The alleged predator must have rational ground for expecting to recoup the losses
which occur during the first phase of predation when he is selling below costs.
Without such an expectation predatory pricing is not sensible economic
behaviour27. Recoupment is thus the ultimate long term objective of a predatory
pricing scheme28, which harms through the monopolistic prices charged the
consumer. Moreover, unless predation can be followed by a period when the lost
profits can be recouped, there is no threat to competition, since consumers will
benefit from the low prices during predation and if the firm has insufficient market
power to recoup later, consumers will not be hurt29.
Recoupment can also be defined more broadly than merely retrieving the initial
monetary losses. It could also be seen as a reputational benefit30 that occurs not
only in the market where the predation has taken place but in other markets
where the predator is active. In that case anticipated recoupment is magnified and
predation becomes more plausible31.
                                                
24 See Milgrom/Roberts at 118 et seq. for further discussion.
25 McGee (1958) at 137 et seq.
26 See below at 2.3.3.1.
27 Elzinga/Mills at 2479.
28 See C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Belge Transports and others v Commission
29 Korah at 125.
30 This is part of the reputation strategy described below at 2.3.3.1.
31 Hovenkamp (2001) at 280.
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2.3.2 Mergers
It has been argued that a better strategy of gaining monopoly power would be to
simply merge with the rival, as a merger would avoid the large losses to the
dominant firm of a predatory pricing campaign32.
However, on the one hand, the rival may not be willing to merge and to maintain
its independence. On the other hand, since a merger requires regulatory approval,
while a predatory strategy, though illegal, is more difficult to detect and to
prosecute. What is more, in order to succeed with gaining monopoly power, the
merger must result in a monopoly which is contrary to both competition policies in
the US and the EC. Predatory pricing is hence a more subtle, though illegal,
business strategy.
2.3.3 Strategies of predation
Economists have identified various business strategies which make predation a
rational conduct for a firm. Predatory business behaviour can involve such
strategies as predatory investment, excessive product differentiation, predatory
advertising or predatory product innovation33. Here the focus shall be exclusively
on predation strategies which involve predatory pricing as such.
2.3.3.1 Game theories
The game-theory challenges the static framework of perfect information on which
scholars that dismissed the rationality of predatory pricing had relied34 and
explains predatory pricing in a dynamic world of imperfect and asymmetric
information in which strategic conduct can be profitable35. The predator as the
established firm has an information advantage over potential new entrant
concerning costs and his own, due to his experience on the market36.
This information asymmetry gives therefore rise to aggressively low prices and
high outputs to attempt to influence a rivals behaviour, by making him believe that
competition faced by a rival which is new to the market is substantial or future
entry into the market will be unprofitable.
                                                
32 McGee (1980) at 295 et seq., OECD at 10.
33 for a detailed appraisal of the latter see Ordover/Willig at 8 et seq and on non-price
predation OECD at 13.
34 As McGee did in his Standard Oil Case re-examination. Selten used game theory to
demonstrate how rational players could unravel threats of predation in multiple markets in
his ”Chain Store Paradox” article. However, subsequently economic scholars demonstrated
that the logic of his game theory would only hold for multiple markets with perfect
information, see OECD at 11.
35 See Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 8.
36 Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 73 and OEDC at 12
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Asymmetries in the information available to predator and prey, as described
above, and linkages between competitors` interactions in different markets allow
this attempt to influence the rivals  `behaviour through their beliefs to be successful.
The predator may establish a reputation for aggressive conduct of applying
predatory pricing schemes when faced with hard rivals and on the signalling side.
The predator may be able to send misleading signals about market demands and
costs to competitors, making them believe that market conditions are
unfavourable37. By this the predator induces the prey to believe that demand is
too low to justify market entry and abandons further entry attempts.
These strategies include reputation effect, cost signalling, test market and signal
jamming. Cost and demand signalling is designed to induce the prey to mistakenly
believe that demand is low in a market the prey seeks to enter. In cost signalling a
predatory drastically reduces prices to mislead the prey to believe that the
predator has lower costs than themselves. In signal jamming, the predator openly
cuts prices in order to distort the test market results of the potential entrant, foiling
the test and consequently making it impossible for the latter to determine whether
market demand for its product is sufficient to support entry38. These may prove to
be plausible strategies because a firm`s decision to enter or to leave a market is
necessarily based on its evaluation of future revenues and costs.
2.3.3.2 Financial market predation
Financial market predation is closely connected with the deep pocket
requirement, where the predator must able to sustain losses for a longer period of
time than his prey and by that forcing it out of the market. However, under a
financial market predation strategy, the predator focuses on the relationship
between the prey and its investors, since in flexible economic capital markets
there exists the possibility that profit seeking investors may be willing to finance
the prey.
The predator tries to manipulate this relationship by inducing termination threats
by the rival`s investors in order to dry up the financing of the firm. This strategy
becomes viable because of imperfections on the economic capital markets, with
investors facing problems when managers of the prey take excessive risks to
shield assets from its creditors or otherwise fail to protect the investor`s interests
and consequently imposing an implicit or explicit threat of termination of the
investment contracts39.
                                                
37 see Bolton/Brodley/Roirdan at 73 and 86; Hemphill at 16.
38 Ibid. at 90 et seq.,with further references, O`Hagan at 2
39 Ibid. at 54, with further references.
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2.4 Predatory pricing in the different industries
As demonstrated above, predatory pricing will occur when the market conditions
are favourable, i.e. when the predator holds a dominant position and high entry
barriers which make recoupment likely. This is especially the case when
regulatory framework and the structure of the industry itself is in favour of these
conditions. These conditions exist particularly in deregulated industries, where
former monopolists still have dominant positions and market power which may be
used to discourage entry of potential competitors40. As regulations in such
industries are liberalised the scope of predatory action may increase. The
abolition of legal privileges of former state owned monopolists does most often
not result in immediate increased competition, since the former monopolists still
have a dominant positions and market power, which they are willing to defend by
all means necessary.
The airline industry gives such an example, since new airline carriers are able to
compete head-to-head with incumbent dominant national carriers on their prime
profitable routes which have been previously restricted through regulatory control.
Generally speaking, network industries provide fruitful ground for predators. This
becomes apparent in the telecommunications area, where services require a
network, which to create from scrap is neither easy nor cheap41. The software
industry presents a third example. Software companies can give away products at
next to zero prices for which there are important network economies in order to
turn those products into the industry standard, which rivals could not have access
to. Losses are subsequently recouped once the standard is gained42. Lastly, the
maritime shipping sector should be mentioned, in which establishing fighting ships
may prove a successful predatory pricing strategy by modifying freight tariffs in
order to offer lower rates that the competitor for vessels sailing on the same route
around the same date43.
                                                
40 See Faure-Grimaud at 850 and below under 5.3.
41 P.ex. Nicolaides/Polmans at 21et seq.
42 See Niels/TenKate at 808 and below under 5.1.4.
43 See and Niels/Ten Kate 806.
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3 Theories for Assessing
Predatory Pricing
Proposals of identifying harmful predatory pricing have been brought forward by
the academic debate ever since McGee subjected the matter to economic
analysis44. Although his results ran counter to standard intuition, they held sway as
late as 1980, as no other theory emerged to refute it. Since then, however,
economic analysis of the subject has taken a new approach yielding models of
predation as a profitable and likely strategy for firms. When Areeda and Turner
introduced their cost-based test to determine if pricing is predatory in 1975, no
theoretical model of predatory pricing existed. However, this test has been
criticised and a number of alternative tests emerged. Advances in economic
theory over the last twenty years provide the tools to conduct the close analysis
that recent court decisions have called for.
The goal of each of the approaches is to offer the most effective means to achieve
a balanced predatory pricing policy and to protect competition in a world of
increasingly complex business transactions and strategies. The test chosen to
identify predatory pricing has to overcome two main difficulties Firstly, that it must
foster competition on the merits allowing more efficient firms to drive put of the
market less efficient rivals and, secondly, at the same time it has to deter the
behaviour of dominant firms which could take advantage of their position to
eliminate or discipline socially desirable competitors. The equilibrium between
these two poles is difficult to achieve and might explain the wide range of theories
and tests provided by the commentators.
Tests on how to determine the thin line between unlawful conduct and healthy
competition are indeed disputed in the academic debate in mind-numbing detail.
The only basic agreement in the various approach suggestions appears to be that
scrutinizing a company`s conduct requires careful examination and factual inquiry
which has to be guided by a sound legal rule and a thorough economic analysis.
However, disagreement is vast concerning the recognition of a proper and
workable rule. It ranges from the acknowledgment that predatory pricing occurs
rather seldom and any attempt to restrict competition harms more that it helps, to
detailed economic analysis tests which seem to overload the courts ability to work
efficiently45.
                                                
44 By scrutinizing the case Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v US 221 U.S. 1, 47, 76
(1911), see fn. 5.
45 Hovenkamp (2001) at 288.
17
3.1 No rule approach
Some economists, namely the Chicago school of thought, argue that predation is
so rare that there should be no legal rule against it. Bork holds the very existence
of predatory pricing in question, since it would be self-deterring and therefore
government intervention unneeded46. Any rule would do much more harm than
good by running the risk of false positive errors with the courts having grave
difficulties distinguishing predatory from legal competitive behaviour. As
Easterbrook puts it, the antirust offence of predation should be forgotten47.
Given the long history of predatory pricing litigation, the very existence of the
phenomenon seems hard to deny48, while at the same time the risk of false
negative and positive errors harming competition on the merits is to be
recognised.
3.2 Price-cost tests
The greater number of authors have suggested an approach which would
condemn a firm when the price charged for the product or service does not cover
some measure of its costs, using the relationship of the dominant firm`s prices to
its costs as the primary tool for identifying predatory pricing. However, there is a
great deal of disagreement amongst scholars on which costs and which time frame
should be applied when defining the appropriate benchmark once competition on
the merits turns into illegal predatory pricing.
3.2.1 Areeda-Turner test
The most influential test for analysing allegations of predatory pricing was put forth
by the Harvard law professors Areeda and Turner in 197549. It has been widely
adopted by US courts and has been generally considered the standard test for
identifying predatory pricing50, even though it has been applied with variations51.
The test focuses on short-run costs and presumes prices to be predatory if they
are below the short-run marginal costs of providing the product or service, unless
it is higher than ATC. Since marginal costs are notoriously difficult to determine,
they would substitute them with AVC as a more practical proxy. The advantage
of such a rule, focusing solely on price-cost comparison, is its simplicity which
avoids complicated structural analysis or subjective enquiries about the intent of
the alleged predator. It establishes an objective, uniform test for all kinds of
                                                
46 Bork at 154.
47 Easterbrook (1981) at 336.
48 See Viscusi/Vernon/Harrington Jr. at 284.
49 Areeda/Turner at 697 et seq.
50 See Bishop/Walker at 129.
51 Circuit courts augmented the test with other factors such as intent and market structure.
The Supreme Court did not explicidly pass on the merits of the test, but indicated that only
prices below some measure of costs would establish unlawful predation, see
Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 17, Hovenkamp (1996) at 834 and below under 5.2.
18
predatory behaviour52. On the other hand it is this simplicity that has been
criticised for not taking into account the broader economic and strategic aspects
of predatory pricing and for only achieving rough justice by relying merely on cost
data53.
3.2.2 Long-term cost-based rules
Posner dismisses the short-run analysis and proposes that long-term costs are a
better guideline when approaching predatory conduct since the predator, by
pricing at short-run marginal costs, could eliminate an equally or more efficient
rival who lacks the ability or will to sustain losses in the short-run54. Furthermore it
is criticised that a short-run cost based test does not take into account that what
really worries a firm is a long-term profit maximisation and other prerequisites
such as intent and possible defences of the pricing conduct need would be
added55.
Lastly it can be argued that short-run marginal costs are not the unquestionable
parameter of optimal resource allocation, seeing that when taking into account the
various market imperfections, the difference between this measure of costs and
price does not necessary reflect the opportunity cost of “sacrified” resources and
that the dominant firm`s marginal cost is determined by previous investment
decisions which are not necessarily optimal56.
3.3 Performance tests
Two other tests focus as well on long-term evaluation, though in different ways,
by scrutinising the alleged predators performance after the exit of a rival from the
relevant market.
The output expansion rule put forward by Williamson focuses on the output of the
alleged predator. A firm confronted with a potential new entrant would produce
at high output without violating the marginal cost or AVC rule and would however
restrict output and raise price until the actual entry occurs, maximising profits at
that level of capacity57. If the output of a firm would be constant or lower in the
face of entry of new rivals to the market, it would be held free of predatory
pricing charges. The negative effects could be avoided by prohibiting the
established firm from expanding output in response to entry for a period of 12 to
18 months.
However, this test would nevertheless involve a complex set of rules, including a
rule based on AVC and does therefore not aviod the problems on determining the
                                                
52 Martinez at 99.
53 See p.ex. Hovenkamp (1996) at 836 et seq.  with further references.
54 Posner at 190 et seq.
55 See Martinez at 99 and OECD at 25, Scherer at 869 et seq.
56 Koller at 301.
57 Williamson at 213 et seq.
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costs discussed above. Furthermore, the prohibition of flexible output over a
longer period of time does not allow the firm to adjust to the varying economic
environment58.
This argument becomes even more clear when applying Baumol`s approach, who
would require any price cut made in response to entry to continue for a period of
5 years in order to limit the incentives for a predator since he would not be able to
recoup his losses59. However, controlling the price may prove to be difficult for
reviewing authorities, since the predator could claim changes in costs and demand
which would be difficult to refute. Furthermore, the rule would be effective only
after the exit of the prey, so that the predator was already successful in the first
stage of the predation period, harming competition by eliminating its rival.
3.4 Rule of reason tests
In contrast to the tests that focus mainly on cost-price relations, the rule of reason
tests attempt to achieve the goal of establishing predatory conduct with all
available evidence at hand60, rejecting the idea of successfully detecting predatory
pricing on the basis of a single reference.
Scherer proposed a wide-ranging inquiry into many factors surrounding the
predators conduct, including an in-depth economic and historic analysis as well as
the focus on intent and consequences of the conduct, dismissing any pure short-
run cost-based rules61. He argues that a short-run cost test will miss the goal of
long-run allocative efficiency and that cost-based formulas generally would result
in passive behaviour by the dominant firm and chronic excess capacity.
However, even if these thorough enquiry approaches reduce the probability of
false positive and false negative errors, they appear to turn out unworkable due to
the overwhelming flow of information which can not practically and sufficiently
evaluated by the competition authorities. Such an approach might further result in
legal uncertainty62, given that in the absence of exact parameters, firms engaged in
price competition could not know when their pricing policy crosses the line into
illegal predatory conduct. Indeed it has been said that while Areeda and Turner`s
test is good law based on bad economics, Scherer`s recommendations are bad
law based upon good economics63.
3.5 Structural tests
Structural tests seek to incorporate aspects of the rules described above, by using
structural analysis of the relevant market as a first screen and consequently limit
                                                
58 For further arguments against these approaches see Mastromanolis at 217.
59 Baumol at 1 et seq.
60 Philps at 67.
61 Scherer at 869 et seq.
62 See Martinez at 114 and McGee (1980) at 306 et seq.
63 Koller at 286 et seq.
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investigation to markets where favourable conditions for a successful predatory
campaign exist in order to minimise the costs of enforcement errors.
Such two-tier approach was first proposed by Joskow and Klevorick64 and
could be taken as the prototype for structural tests65. Where predatory pricing is
alleged, the market structure question accordingly should be determined first
before opening up an inquiry into the defendants conduct regarding price-cost
analysis and intent. In the initial screening, the market share of the alleged
predator would be scrutinised in order to determine its monopoly power,
followed by an analysis of entry barriers to the relevant market and the dynamics
of competitors and entrants. Only if predation if found to be likely to occur, they
would move on to the second screen, incorporating a number of price-cost tests
not unlike the Areeda-Turner test and the rule of reason tests66. Prices below
AVC would be deemed predatory unless the alleged predator could show that
this strategy is justified due to excess capacity. Prices between AVC and ATC
would be presumed predatory unless the firm could prove that industry was
declining or that the scale of new entry depressed prices. Prices which remained
above ATC would be presumed legal unless a price cut in response to entry was
reversed within two years without a cost- or demand-based reason67.
Taking a look at the market conditions would allow the competition authorities to
efficiently dismiss unfounded claims and thus avoiding complex and time
consuming price-cost analysis to be conducted in each case investigated.
The US Supreme Court now established a two tier approach68, holding that the
prospect of recoupment is the primary test for determining predatory pricing,
letting the price-cost test developed by Areeda and Turner a merely ancillary role.
The ECJ in its AKZO decision also used a two tier approach69, however focusing
on the cost and the strategy of the alleged predator. It condemned prices below
AVC as abusive and prices between ATC and AVC as abusive when determined
as part of a plan to eliminate a competitor.
                                                
64 Joskow/Klevorick at 213.
65 See Martinez at 103.
66 See Joskow/Klevorick at 249ff.
67 Ibid. at 249.
68 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 224 et seq. (1993)
69 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission (1991) ECR I-3359 at para 71.
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4 The Laws
Competition law on both sides of the Atlantic governs predatory pricing on
different levels. In Europe it is regulated on the Community level and within the
Member States legislation, rather similar to the US antitrust legislation on the
federal and state level. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to scrutinise
the EC Member State as well as the State legislation of the US.
4.1 EC laws
Art. 82 EC Treaty is the relevant provision in the EC concerning predatory
pricing70.
It prohibits a firms conduct which abuses a dominant position within the
Community and may affect trade between Member States. Art. 82 EC Treaty
puts forth a non-exhaustive list of examples71, two of which could be applied
against predatory pricing conduct.
Art. 82 (a) prohibits unfair pricing and trading conditions, while Art. 82 (c)
concerns price discrimination. The former provision is applicable to predatory
pricing conduct involving unreasonable low prices, whereas the latter condemns
selective price cuts in the respective markets.
4.1.1 Dominant position
Under Art. 82 only a dominant firm can be condemned of predatory pricing
behaviour. According to the ECJ, a firm is in a dominant position, when it has the
discretionary power to act independently, set its prices and makes other market
decisions without being tightly constrained by competitive pressures72.
In order to establish this prerequisite, the relevant market has to be defined first,
followed by assessing the firms market power, taking into account their share of
the market and other factors73. The market has to be scrutinized with regards to
the relevant product and geographic market by examining the potential demand
and substitutability of the products or services74. This alone has proven to be a
difficult task, as the definition of a market has been controversial, since unduly
                                                
70 Multi-firm predatory conduct could be also condemned under Art. 81. However, the
pricing scheme under cartel predation and single firm predation is rather similar, therefore
only Art. 82 shall be scrutinised in the following, see OECD at 47 and Janow at 5. A cartel
agreement seeking to carry on predatory conduct would clearly fall within the per se
prohibition of Art. 81, see Merkin at 192.
71 See p. ex. Steiner/Woods p 256. Any conduct by a dominant firm which threatens the
structure of  competition in the Community may establish an abuse, see OECD at 47.
72 Case C-27/76 United Brands Co. v Commission (1978) ECR 207 at para 65.
73 See Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. v Commission ECR
215 (1973) and Case C-85/76 Hoffmann LaRoche v Commission (1976) ECR 461.
74 see p.ex. the Commission Notice on definition of the relevant market in OJ C 372 (1997).
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limiting the outer boundaries of those markets may lead to unjustified interferences
of power and predation75.
4.1.2 Abuse
Even though Art. 82 identifies several examples of conduct that are abusive, it
does not provide a definition of what constitutes the abuse. However, in the case
of predatory pricing conduct, the abuse could be found in the pricing behaviour,
condemned as unfair under Art. 82 (a) because of unreasonable low prices and
when pricing involves discrimination under Art. 82 (c).
Predatory pricing can involve both exclusionary and exploitative abuse. The
former occurs when a firms conduct is not based on performance alone and
whose objective is to harm the competitive position of rivals or to drive them out
of the market. The latter involves the attempt of a dominant firm to use its market
power to harm those who it deals with, rather than monopolisation76. In the first
phase of the predatory conduct, a predator would exclude its prey from the
market, even though at this stage, short-term benefits due to low price are present
for the customer. In the second phase, the predator raises its prices to supra-
competitive level by using its monopoly power, thus engaging in exploitative
behaviour.
4.2 US laws
In the US, the relevant federal provisions are to be found in three laws, which
were enacted at different times and not as a unit, but must be understood as a
totality or body of law, since a considerable overlap of coverage exists among
those acts77. A general approach to the issue is contained in the Sherman and
Federal Trade Commission Act, while a more specific one can bee seen in the
supplementary Clayton Act. However, the essence of the predatory pricing claim
is essentially the same under either statute78.
4.2.1 Sherman Act
Section 2 of the Sherman Act79 condemns monopolisation or the attempt to
monopolise any part of commerce among US States. The mere possession of
monopoly power is not prohibited80, rather the unduly acquisition of it.
The offence under Section 2 involves two elements. Firstly the establishment of
monopoly power of the alleged predator in the relevant market and secondly the
                                                
75 see Mastromanolis at 216.
76 See Faull/Nikpay at 146 and Korah at 106.
77 TRR Vol.1 at 2539.
78 Bolton/Brodley/Riordan at 20 under fn 70.
79 U.S.C.A. Title 15, Section 1-7.
80 See U.S. v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563 (1966) at 571.
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wilful acquisition of that power as distinguished from growth as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen or historic accident81. A successful
predatory pricing campaign would involve these two elements, with the pricing
first at artificially low levels, followed by supra-competitive prices after the
predator achieved monopoly power.
4.2.2 Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act82 declares unlawful unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practises, which can be
enforced by the Commission. However, the offences under this Act are covered
mostly by the Sherman and Clayton Act, so that there is no need to go into further
detail83.
4.2.3 Clayton Act
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act84 renders price discrimination as unlawful when it
may substantially lessen competition, tend to create a monopoly or injure, destroy
or prevent competition. In particular primary line discrimination, i.e. local price
cutting and cognate practises, that a firm employs to injure its rivals may be
considered predatory85.
The Act is fairly technical in its requirements and prohibits a discrimination in price
between two buyers of the same seller, of commodities of like grade and quality
where such discrimination may substantially inure competition in any line of
commerce. It expressly establishes specific defences such as meeting prices
offered by competitors and takes into account special circumstances such as the
sale of perishable or obsolete goods86.
One significant development over the past decade is that primary line
discrimination under the Clayton Act has been interpreted more harmoniously
with predatory pricing under the Sherman Act87.
                                                
81 Ibid. at 570.
82 U.S.C.A. Title 15 Section 41-58.
83 In addition to the offences covered by the above mentioned acts, the FTC Act prohibits
generally business behaviour that has direct impact on the comsuming public, making it the
broadest provision on the federal level. Indeed, it has been said that the FTC Act provides
no added dimension, judging from the records on the issue,see Stack at 811 and TRR Vol 1,
at 2521 and 2541.
84 As amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, which detailed and broadened the provisions,
see U.S.C.A. title 15, Section 12-27.
85 OECD at 66.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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5 Cases of Predatory Pricing in
the EC and the US
Despite the large economic literature on predatory pricing and the considerable
case law in the US, there is limited case law in the EC. Thus, when examining
predatory pricing decisions, it must be borne in mind not only that there are
relatively few judgements of the ECJ upon which to base conclusions, but that on
the other hand an analysis may possibly draw from the rich experience US
authorities have with the matter. However, the ECJ established its own approach
towards predatory pricing well within the last two decades.
5.1 EC case law
5.1.1 AKZO
In its AKZO decision88, the ECJ for the first time addressed the issue of
predatory pricing. AKZO, a Dutch producer holding approximately 50% of the
organic peroxide market in Europe, engaged in systematic conduct, inter alia
below-cost pricing, selective price cuts and threats, aiming to prevent ECS, a
small competitor originally operating in the English market of flour additives from
expanding in the related plastics sub-market. AKZO first threatened ECS to drive
them out of the flour additives market and eventually offered large discounts to
ECS´ customers. ECS claimed an infringement of Art. 86 (now Art. 82) EC
Treaty to the Commission, which found that AKZO had abused its dominant
position by offering below-cost prices.
The ECJ used a cost based test and maintained the reference to intent as another
element of its predation test, thus applying a two-tier test by using the cost based
analysis of the pricing strategy as a first screen and as a second screen scrutinising
the firms strategic behaviour when the pricing is found not to be clearly below a
cost measure.
According to the ECJ, prices below AVC almost certainly indicative of predatory
pricing and are to be considered abusive, since a firm has no interest in setting
such prices unless it is to eliminate a rival because each sale entails a loss. Prices
that are set above AVC but below ATC are to be considered predatory only if
the price is part of a plan for eliminating competition89.
The ECJ rejected the view of the Commission which emphasised the meaning of
intent by referring to its Michelin decision, identifying the concept of abuse as an
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objective one90. However, the ECJ could not totally avoid an element of
subjectivity in the sensitive area between AVC and ATC, since the pricing is
regarded as predatory when part of a business strategy intended to eliminate the
rival. Intent should not be relevant unless it materialises in practice through
systematic exclusionary behaviour. The intention of the dominant firm is thus
identified objectively through the development of a positive exclusionary
strategy91.
The ECJ moreover appears to have left open the possibility for other tests to be
applied and therewith the possibility of prohibiting price differentials in other cases
if the market situation so requires in order to determine whether the pricing
conduct at issue was abusive. The ECJ found merely that the cost based test was
appropriate in view of the specific circumstances92. The submission therefore is
that the ECJ supports a certain flexibility in moulding the competition policy
against abusive pricing conduct.
5.1.2 Tetra Pak II
In its decision from 199793, the ECJ further elaborated the principles laid down in
AKZO. Tetra Pak, producer of aseptic machines and cartons with a market
share of 92% sought to monopolise the neighbouring market for non-aseptic
machines and cartons by engaging inter alia in selling below-costs on the Italian
market and to eliminate its rival Elopak from the maket.
Of particular interest is the ECJ`s finding that Tetra Pak engaged in predatory
pricing on a market in which it was not dominant. The question to be solved was
in what circumstances a dominant firm on one market can anticipate that the
conduct implemented on another market where it is not dominant, will be caught
by Art. 82 or, in other words, the main issue was to establish a link between the
dominant position in one market and the abuse in the other94. Art. 82 gives no
guidance as to what kind of link, if any, needs to exist between the two markets.
However, the ECJ found that such a close relationship existed between the
markets and that this reinforced Tetra Pak`s economic power in the market
where the abuse took place. This may be interpreted in that way that a firm
dominant in one market is put under a special responsibility on those markets
where these links are present and could weaken competition95, which is consistent
with the ECJ`s approach in Michelin, which imposes a special responsibility on
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94 Levy at 104 et seq.
95 Levy at 106.
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dominant firms not to allow their conduct to impair genuine, undistorted
competition96.
The ECJ further rejected Tetra Pak`s argument that it did not have reasonable
prospects to recoup the losses of a predatory pricing strategy in the market in
which it was not dominant by stating that it is not necessary for the Commission to
prove concisively that the predator will be able to raise its prices following the
elimination of the rival. This argument was put forward by Tetra Pak in the light of
the court decisions in the US, where recoupment is a constitutive element in
predatory pricing analysis97. The ECJ held that such an additional prerequisite
was not established in its AKZO decision98, since in the CFI in its decision merely
made the explanatory point that recoupment is the ultimate object of a predatory
pricing scheme and that it must be possible to penalise predatory pricing
whenever there is a risk that competitors will be eliminated99.
However, the ECJ held that a recoupment requirement would not be appropriate
in the circumstances of the present case100. This indicates that the ECJ may well
include the recoupment test in other decisions under different circumstances and
that it will consider recoupment on a case-to-case basis.
5.1.3 Irish Sugar
In 1997, the Commission found that the company British Sugar abused its legal
monopoly for producing sugar101. This case involved, as many predatory pricing
cases, also the issue of selective pricing. The company enjoyed a legal monopoly
for the production of sugar in the UK, selling sugar for both industrial and retail
use, and furnished Napier Sugar, one of its customers, at prices that did not
permit it to operate profitably and compete with British Sugar at the retail level.
At the same time, their retail prices were low enough to prevent imports form
outside the UK. Napier Brown was eventually removed from the retail sugar
market as a result of British Sugar`s actions.
The Commission found an abuse in the selective nature of process, even though
non of the prices were below ATC. Instead, the prices offered were aligned with
those of its competitors and did not significantly under cut them. In its decision,
the Commission found an abuse in the selective pricing strategy, relying again on
the principles set out in Michelin102 that a company in a dominant position has a
special responsibility not to diminish further the degree of competition remaining
on the market. It also made reference to the AKZO decision, where the court
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97 See below at 5.2.
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99 Tetra Pak II at para 44.
100 Ibid.at para 44.
101 Irish Sugar (Case IV/34.621) O.J. 1997 L258/1.
102 See fn. 96.
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condemned discriminatory pricing whereby traditional customers were charged
prices above ATC while equivalent customers of a rival or rivals were charged
prices below ATC, thus finding price discrimination as demonstrative of predatory
intent103.
5.1.4 Compagnie Maritime Belge
The ECJ in Compagnie Maritime Belge104 found that various shipping companies
abused their dominant position by employing the strategy of “fighting ships”. The
firms were members of a shipping conference which engaged in a predatory
pricing conduct by selectively offering low prices on routes of their rival Grimaldi
and Cobelfret, not being a member of the shipping conference, in order to
eliminate the competition. Whenever a sailing was announced by the latter, the
members of the conference would employ their ships on that route. The freight
prices were drastically reduced and different from the ones normally charged,
with the sharing of the loss of revenues by the conference members.
As the prices charged were not below their total costs, Compagnie Maritime
Belge argued that these prices could not deemed to be predatory under the
criteria lied down in AKZO. That the Commission did not challenge, but focused
on the practice itself, which the ECJ confirmed. Accordingly it decided that where
a liner conference in a dominant position selectively cuts its prices in order to
match those of a competitor it eliminates the principle of competition105 and thus
deemed the practice as an abuse of a collectively held dominant position, as the
shipping conference constituted a collective entity vis-à-vis their competitors106.
However, the ECJ refused to rule generally on the circumstances in which a liner
conference may legitimately adopt lower prices in order to compete with its rivals
and thus did not provide an answer whether low prices were abusive107. AG
Fennelly in his opinion furthermore suggests that the need to establish an intention
or a possibility of recoupment should be part of the test for abusively low pricing
by dominant undertakings108. Even though the ECJ did not follow this suggestion,
the ECJ was silent on this aspect and appeared, as done so in its earlier decisions,
to hold open the possibility whether it would require proof of the possibility of
recoupment in future cases.
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5.2 US case law
The US Supreme Court has faced predatory pricing and allied issues ever since
the enactment of the Statutes regarding the problem. During the past thirty years,
the Court`s approach to predatory pricing has ranged from one broadly
protective of competitors with little attention to market structure to one in which
the US dominating view that predatory pricing is a complex matter and does
indeed occur, is fully embraced109.
5.2.1 Utah Pie
In its first “modern” decision on predatory pricing, the Supreme Court in 1967
condemned the pricing conduct of three wholesale baking companies that
operated in several different geographical markets110. In the Salt Lake city area
they were in fierce competition with a small local company, Utah Pie Co., which
only operated locally. The national companies sold bakery goods at lower prices
in Salt Lake City than they did elsewhere, selling at prices below their costs. The
market share of Utah Pie Co. fell substantially, but at the end of the price
competition they still held a market share of over 45%.
What is more, they made profits the entire time. Nonetheless, the Court held that
the declining price structure had lessened competition as a result of discriminatory
pricing by the national companies. More likely, the three defendants were
stripping the plaintiff of its monopoly position rather than predatory conduct111.
5.2.2 Matsushita
Although the lower courts largely adopted one or other versions of the Areeda-
Turner test in the years after the Harvard article, the Supreme Court did not
address the predatory pricing issue until its 1986 decision regarding claims by
American TV-set manufacturers against competing Japanese companies112. Zenith
claimed that the Japanese companies conspired and sold their products below-
costs in the U.S., while selling similar products in Japan at higher than costs levels
in order to cross-subsidise the loss sales in the U.S.
The Court rejected these claims as economically implausible, using what has now
come to be standard recoupment analysis. Because the plaintiff was claiming that
the predatory pricing along with the conspiracy had been conducted over a
period over 20 years, the defendants, even if eventually successful in the attempt
to monopolise, would never be able to recover the losses they would need to
sustain along the way. Furthermore, the Court defined predatory pricing as pricing
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below the level necessary to sell their products or pricing below some measure of
costs113, recognising the controversy surrounding the cost problem, but declining
to address a solution. Moreover, the Court concluded that there is a consensus
among the commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried and even
more rarely successful114. In this decision the Court first revealed the pivotal role
recoupment was to play in predatory pricing analysis.
5.2.3 Cargill
In its Cargill decision115, the Supreme Court reconsidered its view held in
Masushita the same year. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the impending acquisition
of the second and third largest beef packer companies in the US, contending that
it would alter the market structure in a way that would subject them to elevated
costs, lower prices and reduced profits by the means of injury from below-cost
pricing.
The Court reasoned that these losses stem from fierce competition rather than
constituting an antitrust injury and that the merged company would not have been
capable of successfully pursuing a predatory scheme due to the lack of entry
barriers and a low market share. Its definition of predatory pricing now allows for
the possibility that some below cost pricing may be well intended and lawful.
What is more, the Court recognises that the practise of predatory pricing does in
fact occur.
5.2.4 Brooke Group
In its 1993 decision116 the Supreme Court for the first time in over 25 years
provided a detailed analysis of the substantive standards to be applied on
predatory pricing claims. The decision took place in the oligopolistic cigarette
market where Liggett (Brooke group had been renamed during the course of the
litigation), holding 2% of the market share, introduced generic cigarettes and
began taking sales away from the major companies. Its competitor Brown &
Williamson, holding only 12% of the market share, introduced as a
counterstrategy their own generic brand, but sold them to wholesalers at lower
prices than Liggett, along with discount and rebates. Liggett claimed that Brown
& Williamson was attempting to force them to raise the prices as the means of
slowing the growth of the generic market, which would enable the latter to reap
supracompetitive profits from its branded lines for a longer period of time.
The Court firstly equated the standards of the Sherman and the Robinson-Patman
Acts, so that a plaintiff firstly must prove that the prices complained of are below
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an appropriate measure of costs and, secondly, that he needs to demonstrate that
the alleged predator had reasonable prospect or that there is the dangerous
probability of recouping its investment in below-cost prices, thus hurting
competition. The Court viewed oligopoly recoupment as highly unlikely and held
that Liggett failed to prove the possibility of recoupment by Brown & Williamson.
However, the Court declined, as it did before, to solve the issue of what
measures of costs was most appropriate to analyse the pricing conduct, since the
parties in this case agreed that the relevant measure of costs is AVC117.
5.3 Recent developements in the EC and US
5.3.1 EC
5.3.1.1 Deutsche Post AG
In its decision against the Deutsche Post AG (DP) in 2001118, the Commission
found that DP engaged in predatory pricing in the market for business parcel
services. DP`s competitor on the parcel-delivery sector UPS complained to the
Commission that DP could sell parcel-delivery services below costs, only
because of its revenues from the letter-mail monopoly. In addition to that it was
found that DP had given fidelity rebates to its large mail-order customers and was
find 24 million Euros for this.
However, the predatory pricing was not fined, since the relevant measure of costs
that a multi-product or multi-service postal operator benefiting from a reserved
area has to meet competitive activities has not been clarified previously, with the
Commission adding that the economic cost concepts used to identify predation
were not sufficiently developed at the time the abuse occurred119. Now however,
situations where a firm can cross-subsidise between a monopoly market and a
competitive market a monopolist`s activity in the competitive market are
considered predatory if they do not cover their incremental costs, i.e. the costs
which occur only when a certain activity, p.ex. a new product line, takes place
and which would be avoided if the activity ceased120. This was the first formal
Commissions decision in the postal sector under Art. 82 EC Treaty, prohibiting
predatory pricing conduct as an abuse of a dominant position.
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5.3.1.2 Commission notice on application rule to access
agreements in the telecommunications sector
The Commission also stressed the importance of incremental costs in its notice on
the application of competition rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector121. The Commission addresses the problem of
common costs in the notice and indicates that it will use incremental costs as the
lower threshold for predatory pricing in the telecommunications sector. This sits
well with the Areeda-Turner approach, since they advocate a short-run marginal
cost test. If AVC cost is deemed to be a good proxy for short-run marginal costs
where there are no common costs then short-run incremental costs should be
considered a good proxy  where there are common costs122.
5.3.1.3 Draft notice on the application of the competition rule to
anticompetitive practices in air transport
It the draft notice regarding the rules on anticompetitive practices in air
transport123, the Commission, as in the notice concerning the telecommunications
sector, recognises the difficulty in applying the AKZO test to this market, here
specifically concerning the calculation of the measure of output in the airline
industry. A further point is that it would be unrealistic to consider whether any
individual fare is predatory, but rather that the entire fare mix has to be
considered. It is suggested that the characterisation of costs as  fixed or variable is
more difficult in the air transport sector than in manufacturing industries, since
many costs which would be considered as fixed, such as depreciation on aircraft
which varies in relation to age of the aircrafts and the frequency of use as regards
to the number of take offs and landings124.
Another demonstration of the complexity of pricing in this sector is that seats are
sold over a considerable period of time, right up to the time of departure of the
plane. If the AKZO test would be properly applied, a comparison of fares against
those costs which were available at the time of the sale, which would be rather
complicated and time consuming125. This illustrates the fact that a test for
predatory pricing in the air transport industry needs to be developed with view to
the specific circumstances of the industry and that the simple reception of the
AKZO test would lead to dissatisfying results.
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5.3.2 US
5.3.2.1 Department of Transportation guidelines
Perhaps the most striking development in the US since the Brooke case has been
the proposed Department of Transportation (DOT) guidelines126 which explicitly
recognize predatory pricing as a strategic problem and would allow proof of
recoupment based on reputation effects. These Guidelines focus on the ability of a
major air carrier dominating a city hub to exclude competition and potential
competition127.
The Guidelines would identify as predatory any response to new entry by a hub-
dominant airline that makes economic sense only because it can exclude the
entrant from the market and thereafter charge high fares. Further rely the
Guidelines on a gross revenue measure to identify predation. This substitution of
the traditional cost test may be justified because the special characteristics of the
airline industry markets makes output expansion a particularly effective predation
strategy128. The Guidelines attempt therefore not to define predatory pricing under
a single legal formulation, but rather identify the particular predatory strategy
involved in local airline markets.
5.3.2.2 American Airlines
American Airlines had allegedly engaged in predatory price cutting to keep low-
cost rivals from competing at its Dallas-Fort Worth airport hub, using tactics such
as cutting prices, increasing the number of flights on the respective routes and to
monopolise other routes through its reputation for predation.
However in April 2001, a federal district judge dismissed the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justices claim by granting a summary judgement motion, ruling
that the Division had failed to, firstly, prove below-cost pricing and to, secondly,
adduce objective evidence proving that there was a dangerous likelihood that
American Airlines would recoup its losses129. This decision underscores the
difficulty of successfully prosecuting a predatory pricing case in the US, even
more so that the Department of Justice was thought to have a strong case at hand.
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6 The Different Approaches in
the EC and the US and its
Implications for Predatory
Pricing Analysis
Predatory pricing conduct has been viewed upon with considerable suspicion by
the courts and authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. Even though the EC could
to draw from the rich experience in the US, the approaches of the authorities
towards predatory pricing differ in a number of aspects.
In order to provide workable economic and legal rules to assess predatory
pricing, it remains to be discussed what the implications for the analysis of the
problem are and how authorities can use their experiences and the scholary
debate in order to deal with future predatory pricing cases.
6.1 The different approaches in the EC and the
US
The US antitrust doctrine is exceedingly skeptical about predatory pricing.130 In
the US two test screens, sales of below cost and a market structure conductive to
recoupment, have made it extremely difficult for a plaintiff to succeed in a
predatory pricing claim. Failure to prove the possibility of recoupment is an
independent defence to a predatory pricing claim and most courts have looked
first to the recoupment standard, especially when the measure of costs is
unclear131. The Supreme Court, however, did not pass on the merits of the
Areeda-Turner test , but indicated that a price could not be predatory unless
below some measure of incremental cost132. The Supreme Court let the test play
only an ancillary role and instead focused on the possibility of recoupment which
should be considered first before proceeding to cost calculations.
The ECJ also uses a two-tier test, not unlike the Joskow-Klevorick test, based
on the cost and the strategy of the alleged predator, but contrary to the US
practise using a cost based test as the first screen. The ECJ in AKZO rejected
the Aeeda-Turner test as inappropriate given the facts of the case, but
nevertheless incorporated the idea that prices below AVC should be presumed
predatoryof the judgement133. The ECJ then turns to a presumption of predation
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and a rule of reason test, going into detail on market structure and intent as part of
the alleged predators plan to abuse its dominant position134.
In the AKZO case, AKZO would not have been able to recoup its profits lost in
the siege of predation. The ECJ focused on the problem of eliminating or
disciplining a competitor, in contrast with US jurisprudence, which reflects the
worry that legal protection against a competitor`s low prices is likely to be costly
to consumers, who are denied the advantage of low pricing.
The ECJ subsequently confirmed its position in Tetra Pak II, that recoupment is
not a necessary element of a predatory pricing case. The ECJ, contrary to Tetra
Pak`s argument that recoupment was essential, held that it does not introduce
recoupment as a further legal requirement and that the CFI in its judgement
appealed against merely made the explanatory point that recoupment is the
ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing scheme.135 However, the ECJ
appears to have left open the possibility of scrutinising the possibility of
recoupment in future predatory pricing cases, recognising the utility of such a
screen now used by the US Supreme Court.
Further the ECJ stressed that it must be possible to penalise predatory pricing
whenever there is a risk that competitors will be eliminate and that the aim
pursued, which is to maintain undistorted competition, rules out waiting until such
strategy leads to the actual elimination of a competitor.
When assessing the market structure in order to determine the dominance of a
firm, the proxy of market share is another element which is used differently across
the Atlantic. Whereas in the EC lower levels might suffice to establish a firms
dominance, high shares are required in the US136.
Moreover, EC treatment of predation, consistent with EC law generally, suggests
a concern to protect competitors as wall as future concerns from both
exclusionary and exploitative abuses. The wider objective of competition
provisions in the EC as compared to the US becomes further apparent from AG
Fennelly`s opinion in Compagnie Maritime Belge when he states that the pursuit
of the objective of Art. 3 (g) EC Treaty of ensuring the establishment of an
internal market in which competition is not distorted would be significantly
impaired, if only a price cost comparison would be used as an absolute yardstick
against which all possible abusive or exclusionary practices had to be assessed137.
The ECJ in Tetra Pak II held that the actual scope of the special responsibility
imposed on a dominant undertaking must be considered in the light of the specific
circumstances of each case which show a weakened competition situation, which
makes clear that the main goal of EC competition policy is more than merely
efficiency as a goal pursued by US jurisdiction
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6.2 Implications for antitrust analysis
The discussion above demonstrates all to well that antitrust law continues to
demand a careful and most likely fairly complicated economic analysis of the
challenged conduct. The question to be solved is in how far the competition
authorities can use their experiences in order to effectively solve upcoming
predatory pricing cases.
6.2.1  The future of predatory pricing claims and policy
From the recent developments it can be seen that the US courts look at the
predatory pricing issue in a less strict way than it is viewed at in the EC.
In the US, it appears that predatory pricing claims are fairly unlikely to succeed in
view of the fact that the introduction the recoupment standard severely limits the
plaintiff`s ability to prove predatory pricing138. The Supreme Court`s Brooke
Group decision thus sends a chilling message to potential predatory pricing
plaintiffs139 The recoupment standard is rigorous and this screen doubtless will be
used to strengthen pre-trial summary judgements. It is difficult enough for a simple
monopolist to recoup its investment in predation, for an oligopolist the obstacles
to recoupment are even grater. In fact, no case since Brooke Group has
progressed to a successful final judgement140.
When viewed through an efficiency lens, as done so under US competition policy,
the immediate consequence of predatory pricing conduct is lower prices and thus
the benefit for customers. Here US law has generally been more concerned with
protecting the competitive process than protecting firms or competitors141.
In the EC, competition authorities are more receptive toward predatory pricing
complaints142, as has been illustrated by the recent cases brought before the ECJ
and the Commission. In the EC, concern about single market integration,
protection of competitors and the viability of small businesses have been a more
central concern to competition authorities than in the US than economic efficiency
alone. EC law incorporates values other than efficiency. Values such as fairness,
opportunity and legitimacy are heeded under EC law and it pays special attention
to the viability of small businesses. This reflects the interest in using Community-
wide law to address the economic fragmentation of Europe and thus foster the
further economic integration of Europe and trade between the member states143.
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This is demonstrated further by the ECJ in its Michelin144 decision, where it stated
that a dominant undertaking is under a special responsibility not to diminish further
the degree of competition remaining on the market and by AG Fennely when he
agrees with AG Jacobs145 that there may be a greater responsibility for dominant
firms not to exclude competitors146.
In the US on the other hand, the danger which some o the Chicago scholars see is
that intervening in predatory pricing issues hurts more than it helps is a rather
specific US problem. In the EC one can not speak of waist of resources when the
competition authorities investigate in predatory pricing claims, simply due to the
relative small number of cases investigated, which at the same time eliminates the
danger of misuse of the laws by competitors which try to slow down competition.
This has to do with three main aspects of US laws. Firstly, in the US around 90%
of the predatory pricing claims are filed by private persons or entities and not by
the competition authorities. The legal institute of treble damages creates a
tremendous incentive to take legal action. Another reason which should not be
underestimated is that the plaintiff under US civil procedural law does not
generally have to bear the costs of the defendant when he loses the cases147.
To sum it up, predatory pricing in the EC is viewed upon with more suspicion by
the authorities than in the US due to the different goals that competition policy
pursues148. In the EC, competition authorities are willing to accept more
predatory pricing claims, whereas in the US it seems under current case law
virtually impossible to have a successful case.
6.2.2 Essential elements to a workable predatory pricing
approach
Developing a workable approach to identify predatory pricing which takes into
account the need for legal certainty on the one hand and leaves enough room for
an evaluation of all the facts involved in each individual case seems to pose a
hopeless task. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify one proper rule on
predatory pricing, to overcome the difficulties presented above.
However, the essential elements of a workable approach to the problem can be
identified in a broad manner, which could be perceived as the cornerstones of
such a rule. There appears to be the consensus in the scholary debate and in the
approaches taken by competition authorities and courts on both sides of the
Atlantic that a workable rule has to involve a cost-based analysis as well as a
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structural one, providing two screens in order to detect predatory pricing conduct
of a company. Bearing in mind the controversy within the debate, merely a
mechanical comparison between price and cost is not enough, but instead a
comprehensive assessment of the effects and aims of the price conduct is
necessary in order to identify predatory pricing conduct.
The problem of determining the appropriate measure of costs is mind-boggling
given the complexity of business decisions and the subtle nature of the firms
behaviour and the inferences involved149. However, the need for such a cost-
based rule is apparent to avoid false positive and false negative errors150. To
deem prices below AVC as predatory as such creates problems in industries
where excess capacity is present, p.ex. when there is a risk that a product
becomes obsolete or perishes or in the event of introductory promotion
campaigns. Hence these prices do not necessarily imply that the firm engages in
predatory behaviour. This can also be seen in the software industry, where the
variable costs tend towards zero due to the low multiplication costs of software
programs151. Therefore it has been suggested to use incremental costs as a lower
threshold152.
The Commission in its notice regarding competition rules on the
telecommunications sector recognised that structures in network industries tend to
be quite different to most other industries and gives as an example the low
variable costs, reflecting that in network industries in general, a simple application
of the AKZO rule would not reflect the economic reality of network industries153.
Recognising the difficulty to, firstly, identify the appropriate measure of costs and,
secondly, to calculate the costs itself, it appears to be most fruitful to turn to other
screening methods before performing complex price-cost analyses. That is even
more so, since performing an in depth analysis would be inefficient due to lengthy
inquiries in the relevant industries pricing calculations.
Such a first screen should involve an analysis of the market structure, the prospect
of recoupment and intent. This would focus enforcement on cases where
economic conditions make predation strongly plausible and where market
conduct makes anticompetitive effects dangerously probable. Recoupment is only
possible where high (re-)entry barriers to the market exist. If the probability of
recoupment is not high, a firm would refrain from applying a predatory pricing
strategy, as it would only engage in such a conduct when it will later earn supra-
competitive profits. Reliance of intent has, however, the disadvantage that the
elimination of rivals is inherent in competition. Economists frequently use the word
“intent to exclude” to refer to conduct that would not be commercially sensible
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unless it excluded. This interpretation has the advantage of being objective and
avoiding chasing for documents with macho statements154.
Therefore, the key to a proper assessment to predatory pricing appears to be the
combination of a cost-based test with a first screening of the market conditions to
decide whether predatory pricing is indeed possible and as a second test look
into a price cost analysis, which oftentimes is hard to accomplish.
Amid all the complexity and uncertainty on which is the proper rule to assess
predatory pricing, one last point should be made. Since a firms predatory pricing
behaviour oftentimes involves selective and hence discriminatory pricing, courts
have been able to avoid the entanglement in complex price-cost analyses by
condemning the discriminating pricing itself, be it as an abuse under Art, 82 (c)
EC Treaty or under Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act.
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7 Concluding Remarks
The past 25 years have featured extraordinary ferment in judicial and scholarly
analysis of predatory pricing analysis of predatory pricing allegations. To an extent
unequalled in other areas of competition laws and regulation, the research of
industrial organisation by economists and antitrust attorneys has led courts to re-
shape legal rule governing claims concerning predatory pricing155.
However, as the discussion shows, there is little agreement on the details on how
to deal with the matter at hand. What becomes nevertheless clear is that a purely
cost-based approach will not suffice and does not recognise the complexity of
predatory pricing business strategies. Another screen is needed in order to
correctly identify illegal pricing practices. On the other hand, there is the general
agreement amongst scholars and the jurisdiction that a cost- based test is still
needed. About the other elements of a test is however no consensus.
In order to find an economically and legally workable rule, two factors are crucial.
Firstly can the court not be “overloaded” with facts, which would make it
impossible to come to a decision in an acceptable time frame156. Secondly
mistakes have to be avoided by making false positive and negative errors, which
would undeniably rather harm competition than enhance the welfare of the public.
Indeed, the most workable test appears to be a two-tier test, which would
include a screening of the market first, and if predation seems highly unlikely, the
case could be dismissed. Such an approach would involve in the first screen test,
an investigation of the market structure which would have to show that predatory
pricing is likely to occur, including such aspects as the dominance of the alleged
predator, the existence of high entry barriers and market dynamics. Only cases in
which an affirmative finding is made should pass on to the second stage test. If the
claim survives the first screen, then the courts have the ungrateful task to decide
on a cost based test, whether a companies comply with the laws and competition
policy. The courts on both sides of the Atlantic now apply such a two-tier test,
however with different elements, as has been illustrated by the case law of the last
20 years.
In the US it appears that predatory pricing claims are fairly unlikely to succeed, in
view of the fact that the introduction the recoupment standard limits the plaintiff`s
ability to prove predatory pricing to a great extent. In the EC, the Commission
and the ECJ seem more perceptive towards predatory pricing behaviour, which
can be attributed towards the wider objectives of EC competition policy, namely
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the concern about single market integration, protection of competitors and the
viability of smaller businesses.
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Supplement A
Article 3 EC Treaty
1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in the Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out
therein:
…
(g) a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted;
…
Article 81 EC Treaty
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction of distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions
…
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them under competitive disadvantage;
…
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Article 82 EC Treaty
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
…
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
…
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Supplement B
Sherman Act
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, of within foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.
…
2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony…
…
Clayton Act
2 (a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any
of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States…and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers with either of
them…
…
Federal Trade Commission Act
5 (a) (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts of practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
44
…
5 (a) (2) The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations…from using unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce
…
45
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